Does Sectarian Politics in Lebanon have a place in 2024?
A country of only 10,452 km^2, yet containing 18 officially recognised religious groups, Lebanon’s political system is characterised by a unique experiment in governance. Enshrined in the National Pact of 1943 and later formally recognised in 1989 through the Taif Agreement, key political positions and parliamentary seats are allocated among the country’s largest religious sects, predominantly Christian Maronites (32.4%) Shia Muslims (31.2%) and Sunni Muslims (31.9%) (Theodora, 2024). In a country marked by religious diversity, this system aimed to expand on inclusivity and stability. However, since its implementation it has only further entrenched sectarian divisions and perpetuated corruption. Suffering from economic collapse, political paralysis, and an ongoing war with Israel, is sectarianism helping Lebanon in handling these issues?
The origins of the sectarian system stem from the Ottoman Empire and the millet system, a form of governance focused on religious minorities which provided religious communities with the authority to oversee their affairs such as managing taxation and education. Each millet was headed by a spiritual leader such as the patriarch for the Christians who acted as a mediator between the local community and the Ottoman authorities, allowing for a diverse region to function in theory. However, the vision of what one describes as Lebanese conflicts with their sectarian interests, leading to individuals presenting themselves based on their sect rather than a national identity. Recent examples of the fractured national identity occurred in March 2023 during Ramadan, when religious and political authorities could not agree on “when clocks should go forward” (BBC, 2023) creating two separate time zones based on the region. Predominantly Muslim areas moved the time forward by an hour whereas the Christian areas were left unchanged. The millet structure continued under the French Mandate (1920-1943), where sectarian divisions were formalised as a governance structure.
After Lebanon declared independence in 1943, the National Pact established an unwritten agreement, highlighting that the president must always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim. Parliamentary seats were allocated in a 6:5 ratio favouring Christians over Muslims, institutionalising sectarian representation, which became a source of tension for the Sunni and Shia Muslims, especially in this day as the Christian population in the country has decreased. This ratio was made possible due to strong Maronite opposition to the Ottoman Empire especially in Mount Lebanon, who were often at odds with the Ottoman authorities and rival groups like the Druze. France exploited these tensions and positioned themselves as a protector of the Maronites. An example of this is seen in the 1860 Druze-Maronite Conflict, otherwise referred to as the “Druze-Maronite Massacre of 1860” where around 11,000 Christians died from the conflict and over 4,000 from starvation. The massacre led to an international intervention by European superpowers which eventually forced the Ottoman authorities to assign a Christian ruler to Mount Lebanon. This conflict marked a significant turning point and exposed the flaws of the millet system which began to turn the Lebanese against one another and form separate allies within the same region.
What was already a fragile balance of coexistence turned into entrenched polarisation and hostility during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). Starting from the disproportionate political power of the Maronites which reflected the outdated 1932 census favouring Christians, to the marginalisation of the Shia Muslims despite being the largest in terms of population; politically underrepresented and economically disadvantaged due to their concentration in areas in South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, which were significantly underdeveloped compared to their counterparts (Brill,2011). Shias had less political representation than the Druze who only consisted of 4.5% of the population. What catalysed the tensions even further was the influx of Palestinian refugees after the Six Day War of 1967 where the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Lebanon was kicked out of Jordan after the events of the 1970 Black September conflict and settled in South Lebanon. Lebanon became a central base for the PLO and the Palestinian presence changed from a refugee crisis into a geopolitical flashpoint. Christian Maronites viewed the PLO as a threat to the sectarian balance and feared that the growing power could shift Lebanon to Muslim dominance. The Muslims on the other hand sympathised with the Palestinians, especially the Shia Muslims as they had been deprived of their rights as Lebanese citizens in the country compared to the Sunnis and Maronites, considering their marginalisation Shia majority areas had lower GDP per capita figures, higher mortality rates and lower access to education. The Civil War ended with the Taif Agreement being signed in 1989. However, this failed to dismantle sectarianism and instead, only redistributed power in favour of Muslims, particularly the Shias while maintaining the structure that perpetuates division.
Since 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with one of the worst economic crises in modern history, overseeing a 95% devaluation of its currency and the collapse of essential services. As of 2022, 80% of the population lives below the poverty line and the sectarian elite have failed to address these issues, whereas the top 10% of Lebanon controls over 70% of the national wealth. Access to electricity, internet, water, education, and healthcare varies from region to region, with Christian areas typically receiving more of those necessities than Shia areas. The challenges led to the “October Revolution” or Thawra, showing signs of solidarity despite all sectarian differences in the country - the main slogan being “All of them means All of them”. Ultimately, however, these protests failed as they struggled to translate their momentum into political power, and the same people protesting fell back to their sectarian roots, particularly through intimidation tactics. The tax distribution is also flawed as it relies on indirect taxes such as value-added tax (VAT) and customs duties, exacerbating social inequality considering the already high poverty rates. The collection of direct taxes is relatively small due to loopholes and widespread tax evasion, which is also a sectarian issue. The tax collection process is also outdated and lacks digital infrastructure which undermines compliance. Officials often accept bribes which allows incomes to be underreported. Currently, Lebanon has not had a president since October 2022 when Michel Aoun’s six-year term ended and parliament was unable to choose another candidate, largely due to the divisions between Sectarian leaders, particularly today where candidates are either pro-Hezbollah or Anti-Hezbollah. Since October, parliament has failed to elect a president 12 times due to this issue (Al Jazeera, 2023).
Despite all of these challenges, sectarian politics still plague the country to this day. Although people grow more discontent every day, it is unlikely that the system will fade away. Whether sectarian politics endures or evolves will depend on the willingness of leaders and citizens to prioritise national unity over sectarian interests. The calls for reform seem like an improbable task considering the disparities - however, not impossible. The majority of youth want to change with 68% expressing support for abolishing the sectarian framework (Adyan Foundation, 2020), 76% of the population do not trust in the government and only 13% have trust in the legal system(Arab Barometer, 2024). Sectarian divisions do not adequately serve anyone apart from the elite, and until a whole national identity is formed, Lebanon will be plagued with division, conflict, and uncertainty.
Bibliography
Theodora. 2024, Lebanon people. [Online] Available at: https://theodora.com/wfbcurrent/lebanon/lebanon_people.html#:~:text=Muslim%2067.8%25%20 (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Astier, H., BBC. 2023, Lebanon time zones: Partial clock change causes confusion [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-65079574 (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Image:
https://www.rct.uk/collection/exhibitions/cairo-to-constantinople/the-queens-gallery-buckingham-palace/explore-the-exhibition/the-druze-maronite-massacre-of-1860 (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Raji, W., Rahme, Y., Zeinoun, M., and Zeidan, C, Brill. 2011, The Lebanese Demographic Reality [Online] Available at: https://brill.com/previewpdf/book/edcoll/9789004372634/BP000007.xml (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Al Jazeera. 2023, Lebanon’s Parliament Fails to Elect a President for 12 Time [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/14/lebanons-parliament-fails-to-elect-president-for-12th-time (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Adyanfoundation. 2020, Polling the Lebanese Youth on Politics and Sectarianism- January 2020. [Online] Available at: https://adyanfoundation.org/polling-the-lebanese-youth-on-politics-and-sectarianism-study-report/ (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Arab Barometer. 2024, Lebanon Report- September 2024. Page 12 [Online] Available at: https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB8-Lebanon-Country-Report-EN.pdf (Accessed Nov. 2024).
Well said 👍