How Trump will alter the dynamics of the Ukraine War
Trump’s return to the White House signifies the beginning of a major shift in America’s Ukraine policy. Trump has offered evasive answers on his intentions for Ukraine, from stating that he will end the conflict in 24 hours (Associated Press, 2024) to arguing that Europe should be left at the Russians’ mercy (BBC, 2024). Some in his team have made statements sympathetic to Russia, and admiring Putin (Financial Times, 2024). As alarming as some of these statements are, it is plausible that a Trump presidency could be better for Ukraine than many imagine.
Trump is taking over a much more serious situation than it was in his first term. The invasion of Ukraine has driven the West and the Russians further apart than ever, with Putin forming a de-facto alliance with China and Iran (Atlantic Council, 2024). With Trump’s election, the Biden administration has sought to make it impossible for the incoming president to abandon Ukraine (Business Insider, 2024). Long-range missile strikes on Russia proper have finally been authorised and the conflict may be escalated up to the point of American boots on the ground before inauguration day. In turn, Russia has reciprocated, altering its nuclear doctrine and demonstration-firing an ICBM in Ukraine (Reuters, 2024).
Further rungs likely remain in its escalation ladder such as general mobilisation, the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the use of foreign troops such as the North Koreans. By next year, Trump could face an essentially impossible situation to de-escalate. Worse still, Biden could miscalculate and the Ukrainian frontline could collapse entirely, with the help the Americans offering now coming too little, too late.
Facing this situation, Trump has surrounded himself with people who, whilst sympathetic to Ukraine, are angling for a ceasefire. Many of Trump’s cabinet picks, such as Hegseth and Waltz, have stated they believe the Ukraine situation has only benefited China by driving Russia towards it, as well as draining American supplies of ammunition, missiles and currency (Asia Times, 2024). Their clear priority is preventing a Chinese seizure of Taiwan, which they believe to have been made more likely by American distraction elsewhere, and that this imposes a hard limit on how much more aid the Americans can provide. During his first term, Trump had a less ideological view of the Russians than the previous administration, seeking to align with Putin on issues such as counterterrorism, Iranian non-proliferation and recruiting Russia to be part of a balancing coalition against China (Business Insider, 2024).
So far, indications of Trump’s action on Ukraine have been limited. His advisors have put forward a plan of action which calls for a ceasefire and a freezing of the conflict along the current lines (Reuters, 2024). Ukraine would get weapons and a demilitarised border, and Russia would get recognition of the areas under its control, which have a Russian ethnic majority, as well as a suspension of the accession of Ukraine to NATO. However, Russia will probably consider this a defeat, desiring all the Ukrainian land up to the line of the Dnieper (Kyiv Independent, 2024). By demanding a ceasefire, Trump would put that plan on hold and recognise Ukrainian control of large territories with an ethnic Russian majority, which Russia would not accept as a legitimate outcome. Given that Ukraine is gradually losing ground, this could be preferable to Kyiv than a continuation of the war under a Biden-Harris escalation plan.
Trump’s ascension to the presidency a second time bodes ill for Ukraine, but a full capitulation to Russia is unlikely. The President’s priority will be to bring the fighting to an end, but this will leave both sides’ political goals unfulfilled. Russia’s maximalist goal - the capitulation of Ukraine and the removal of the Ukrainian government - seems unlikely in the extreme (Kyiv Independent, 2024). Ukraine’s maximalist goal - the recovery of the lost territories and the collapse of the Putin regime - is also out of reach. Trump will likely focus on de-escalating the physical fighting rather than attempting to resolve the underlying political question. For Trump to be the one presiding over the handing of Ukraine over to Russia will be seen as a black mark on his presidency, much as the loss of Afghanistan to the Taliban was seen as a black mark on Biden’s. Therefore, de-escalation, far more so than resolution, seems to be the most likely prospect in the coming year.
By Hugh Cuppage
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