"Navigating the Maze: The Evolution and Impact of Micro-Targeting in Modern Political Communication"

As digital platforms continue to redefine the landscape of political communication, micro-targeting has emerged as a pivotal strategy for political actors, enabling the distribution of personalised messaging tailored to individual voter demographics. However, as this article explores, this phenomenon also raises critical questions about data privacy, misinformation, and the evolving role of social media in shaping democratic discourse.

Micro-targeting is everywhere, from the local business flyer through your door to the Instagram ad from your favourite brand. It is a type of advertising that uses data-driven research to generate personalised advertising, with brands like Meta sending you ads based on your age, location, interests and online behaviour, finding the business's ideal consumer (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). Political micro-targeting does the same, allowing the party to reach their perfect voter with targeted campaigns tailored to a voter's specific interests or vulnerabilities. Micro-targeting is not new in the political world, for example, extra campaigning in marginal seats; however, with online campaigns, political parties can further narrow and individualise their focus to specific demographics of voters. One example shows families policy ads that focus on childcare or student campaigns on student loans (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). Additionally, the UK's majoritarian electoral system, in which specific constituencies can have large swings in election results, makes it well suited to a micro-target campaign (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2018). This benefits large parties as well as allowing smaller parties to focus their efforts on likely supporters; for example, UKIP created social media campaigns to help them rebrand and attract a younger demographic (Ross, 2015). 

Political communication is intertwined with digital media, creating a continuous platform for political campaigning. Social media platforms like Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) have become essential tools for election candidates to engage with potential voters, mobilise supporters, and shape public opinion (Munger et al., 2020). Additionally, creating the "Chameleon-like" role of the politician to adapt their presentation based on the platform to target specific demographics (Battista, 2023). For example, online media emphasises personal qualities and focuses on the individual rather than the party whereas traditional media has a greater focus on policy. However, it is not as easy as simply being active online, in the UK 2015 general election, the Labour party dominated online discourse, with the highest volume of posts.This did not translate into nationwide success against the Conservative party's micro-targeting strategy (Munger et al., 2020). The Conservative party leverages data to deliver personalised communication to specific voter segments, adapting cross-platform and utilising canvassing databases, corporate data sources like Mosica and social media insights (Munger et al., 2020). Politicians also tend to adapt the dynamics of their content for different platforms to target various demographics. Facebook is typically used for campaign promotions, whilst X is favoured for commenting on Political events or responding to the opposition (Munger et al., 2020). For example, in January 2024, nearly 20% of Jeremy Hunt's X posts were criticisms of non-conservative MPs or their supporters (Hunt, 2024). In recent years, politics has also moved into platforms like TikTok to engage with younger votes.Despite the fact that TikTok's terms of service restrict overtly political content, MP Zarah Sultana has over 400,000 followers, and Matt Hancock has a TikTok video with over 2 million views (Butler, 2023). The media on TikTok again promotes a personal side to an MP appealing to current trends and the humanity of political figures rather than party politics. 

Moving forward into the election year, political micro-targeting is expected to ramp up. However, UK parties and social media platforms face stricter data protection laws, making precise targeting harder. The UK government has also banned the social media app TikTok from government devices amid data fears (Cabinet Office, 2023). Beyond data issues, platforms tackling misinformation could have a knock-on effect on campaigns. For example, over 35% of Rishi Sunak's X posts in January 2024 had community posts (formerly Birdwatch, Community notes allow contributors to leave notes on any posts to add fact checks, highlight misinformation, or add missing context (Chiara et al., 2023)), adding missing context to his posts (Sunak, 2024). This brings the question of whether sites like X will lose their ability to push targeted campaigns without showing the voters all the context; in practice, a post advertising a proposed tax cut could have the added context of a party's history with tax rises to mitigate this. 

In the dynamic landscape of modern political communication, micro-targeting is a powerful tool for reshaping the interaction between politicians, parties, and voters. As social media platforms continue to evolve and data protection regulations tighten, the future of micro-targeting remains promising and uncertain. 

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