Shattering the monopoly: the utility of ‘oligopolies of violence’ in Syria

Since its onset in 2011, militia groups on all sides of the Syrian civil war have become prominent actors. However, pro-government militias in the Syrian case pose an interesting dichotomy for the regime: on the one hand they have been highly important to the regime’s suppression of dissent and in combating opposition forces; on the other hand their very structure, dispersion and lack of central governance by the regime contradicts Bashar Al Assad’s typically tight grip on government linked forces. Therefore, this urges us to consider why, in the case of Syria, pro-government militias - hereafter referred to as PGMs, have served as a viable complementary force to the centrally weak security forces. 

The Syrian civil war erupted alongside the emergence of the Arab Spring - which sent a ripple throughout MENA in 2011 after Tunisian street vendor Mohammad Bouzazzi’s self-immolation took place as an act of protest against entrenched social inequality and state corruption. In Syria, Arab Spring sentiment spread through anti-regime protests calling for state-reforms - including the release of political prisoners and the removal of the regime’s tactical ‘emergency laws’ which restricted protesting rights and upheld state-security courts that were utilised to restrict freedom of speech (BBC, 2011). Assad’s regime responded quickly and violently to protests - crushing the opposition and brutally arresting protestors whilst making minor concessions. 

PGM emergence in Syria is highly diverse - some have been locally formed through the regime-led ‘Popular Committees’ (PCs), wherein the secret services or mukhabarat organised citizens in pro-government areas, or regions that had been impacted by rebel group violence. Here, the mukhabarat would arm and place groups at checkpoints across the country. PGMs were also largely organised by foreign actors, such as the Iranian ‘Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) and Lebanese militant group Hezboullah. Much of the involvement of Iran and Hezboullah can be linked to the greater Shi’ite sentiment in the region, as Assad’s regime - an ‘Alawite-Shi’ite’ dominated power, is strategically significant to Iran and its greater ambitions in the region.

Further, given the regime’s use of extensive coup-proofing methods in the SAA (Syrian Arab Army) - through sectarian-stacking i.e. the over-representation of one sectarian group - here being the Alawites, in top-ranking military positions (Nizar, 2021;Nassif, 2015) contradicts the deployment of PGMs - which are highly unstructured and cannot be coup-proofed. Nevertheless, PGMs have proven invaluable to the regime’s offensive campaigns - such as the offensive in the northwestern region of the Daraa Province in 2015 - where the 4th Armored Division (military-wing) along with two prominent PGM groups - the National Defence Forces (NDF) and the Shabiha, were reported to have played a role in the advance (Carey et al, 2021; Kozak, 2015:28). This begs the question of whether fractured armed forces can, under an insecure highly-centralised autocratic regime such as the Assad regime, indeed prove to be a viable complementary force to the traditional military of the SSA?

In many ways, this does seem to be the case in Syria. PGMs assisted in the advance of the regime's offensive, although to a limited extent, as other tactics such as ‘siege-and-starve’ (Kozak, 2015) as well as the Russian intervention in 2015 were highly important. Nonetheless, PGMs strike the perfect balance between being materially and geopolitically tactical, whilst equally being incohesive enough not to constitute a viable threat to the regime. Not only does this undermine the Weberian conception of state monopoly on violence (Carey et al, 2022), but it highlights the importance of regime-type to this conception. Thus, insecure autocratic regimes that utilise coup-proofing methods with means of rendering their armed forces unable to fully defend the regime - as exhibited by the SAA (Nizar, 2021), will not only benefit from dispersed armed forces but ratherfrom them as a complementary structure of violence in conflict as shown by the case of Syria. Here, the conception of oligopolies of violence is very interesting to this case study. Following from Omeje (2010), dysfunctional oligopolies can be characterised by their ability to provide security - a key commodity in wartime, in a security-marketplace with a fractured monopoly where the state itself cannot provide security, but does remain the ‘market-leader’. However, PGMs can equally be conceptualised through their provision of violence as a commodity to the regime - through material and ideological means - which is highly relevant to the Syrian case. 

Therefore, it is evident that the traditional view on the state monopoly over violence is limited, as this conception does not account for the utility of fractured armed forces as has been demonstrated by the case of Syria. 

Bibliography:

BBC. (2011). Syria protests: Bashar al-Assad lifts emergency law. Available at: Syria protests: Bashar al-Assad lifts emergency law - BBC News (Accessed: 9. Mar 2024)

Carey, Sabine C., Neil J. Mitchell and Katrin Paula. 2022. “The Life, Death and Diversity of Pro- Government Militias: The Fully Revised Pro-Government Militias Database Version 2.0”. Research & Politics 9(1)

Kozak, C. (2015). “AN ARMY IN ALL CORNERS” ASSAD’S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN SYRIA. Institute for the Study of War. Available at: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep07883 (Accessed: 9. Mar 2024) 

Nassif, H. B (2015). ‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(5), pp. 626-649. Nizar, M. (2021). A Vicious Cycle: An Examination of How the Feedback Loop Between Coup-proofing and Regime Insecurity Helped Facilitate the Rise of Pro-Government Militias in the Syrian Conflict. University of Waterloo. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10012/17404 (Accessed: 9.Mar 2024)

Omeje, K. (2010). Markets or Oligopolies of Violence? The Case of Sudan. African Security, 3(3), pp. 168-189.